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1 Introduction
Disputes about how to share goods and resources usually arise because litigants hold
competing claims, i.e., claims that are mutually inconsistent as their sum exceeds the total
amount that is available. Competing claims are common in the context of sharing natural
resources among di¤erent groups of users (see for instance Giller et al., 2008). They also
characterize so called bankruptcy problems (see Thompson, 2003, for a review) and play
an important role in the division of assets and debts in contested divorces (Wilkinson-Ryan
and Baron, 2008, show experimentally how individualsratings of possible proposals about
how to divide marital property are usually misaligned). In addition, competing claims
gure in the payment of insurance premia between insurance companies and claimants
(Lougran, 2005, reports that 36% of all bodily injury claims appear to be inated) and in
the incidence of disputes about grievances. As an example of the latter, Miller and Sarat
(1980) report that in a sample of 1,768 claims made by agents experiencing grievances,
62.6% were rejected or resisted and thus resulted in disputes. In other words, parties held
competing claims in almost two thirds of such interactions.
The existence of subjective behavioral biases that inuence agentsperception of fair-
ness and lead claimants to overestimate how much they deserve certainly contributes to
generating such a phenomenon. For instance, it is well known that self-serving bias can
create costly impasses in bargaining and negotiations (see Babcock et al., 1995, Babcock
and Lowenstein, 1997, and Farmer et al., 2004). Or that inequity aversion can lead to
ine¢ cient marital dissolution (Smith, 2007). But while behavioral biases unconsciously
a¤ect individualsclaims, the announcement of a high claim can also be the result of a
conscious and strategic decision by the parties. Litigants can in fact purposively exagger-
ate their claims with the goal of inuencing the nal allocation that the judge/authority
will implement.
In this paper, we explore this second option and investigate the strategic aspects related
to agents announcement of their claims. We show that, in a framework of reference
dependent preferences à la Koszegi and Rabin (2006), claimants who expect the judge
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to make the nal decision according to a general form of social welfare function have an
interest in purposively inating their claims.
Reference dependent preferences (RDPs) capture the famous loss aversion conjecture
introduced in the classic article by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). RDPs explicitly ac-
knowledge that agents perception of a given outcome is inuenced by the comparison
between the outcome itself and a certain ex-ante reference point. More precisely, people
dene gains and losses with respect to the reference point and losses loom larger than
gains. RDPs thus seem particularly appropriate to depict the preferences of individuals
involved in disputes and litigations. These are in fact typical situations in which agents
build their own expectations about the allocation that the authority will implement and
inevitably ex-post compare the actual outcome with the expected one.
To sum up, the analysis presented in this paper applies to all those cases in which
reference dependent preferences constitute an appropriate framework, conicting interests
of the agents must be settled by an external authority, and litigants have the possibility
to ex-ante declare what they expect to get. We will be very general about the size, the
nature and the source of the resource to be shared. This can be positive (as in the case
of a divorcing couple arguing over the division of their assets) or negative (as in the case
of an injurer and a victim who cannot agree on how to share a certain loss). Moreover,
the size of the resource can be deterministic and exogenously given (as in the case of two
departments making claims upon the allocation of some external endowment) or it can
instead be ex-ante uncertain and depend on the actions of the agents.
As an example of the latter case, consider a standard tort model of a bilateral accident
(Shavell, 1987) where two agents can take costly actions that may reduce the incidence
of a certain probabilistic loss. As the standard model indicates, agents choose those
actions that maximize their expected utility conditional on the specic liability rule in
force. These choices inuence the probability that the accident occurs and/or the size of
the actual loss. Once uncertainty resolves (say the accident indeed occurs), agents make
claims about how to share the loss and the adjudicator intervenes to solve the dispute.
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The appendix contains a more formal model of a bilateral accident and shows how the
equilibrium allocations that would stem from the implementation of di¤erent liability rules
are consistent with our analysis.
2 The model
We model the situation of two claimants who cannot agree on how to divide a homogeneous
and perfectly divisible good of size S 6= 0. The claimants thus delegate the choice and the
implementation of the nal allocation to an adjudicator/planner. As it has been explained
in the introduction, S can be positive or negative, exogenously given or endogenously
determined by some previous actions of the agents. Let x = (x1; x2) indicate a possible
allocation such that xi is the amount of the good that the planner assigns to claimant
i 2 f1; 2g. If S > 0 then xi 2 [0; S] while if S < 0 then xi 2 [S; 0]. In both cases, e¢ cient
allocations are such that
P
i xi = S.
The adjudicator, in choosing which nal allocation to implement, uses a generalized
utilitarian social welfare function of the form W (u) =
P
i g(iui) where g() is an increas-
ing and strictly concave function with g(0) = 0, ui is the utility of claimant i 2 f1; 2g and
i 2 (0; 1) with 1 + 2 = 1 is the weight that the adjudicator attaches to claimant i. If
1 = 2 = 0:5 then both agents are on the same footing and the social welfare function
is symmetric. On the contrary, if 1 6= 2 then the function is asymmetric as the planner
attributes more importance to the welfare of a specic agent. In the appendix we will show
that, in the context of a standard tort model, the weights i can be nicely interpreted in
terms of the specic liability rule in use.
The concavity of the function g() implies that the planner attaches progressively lower
weight to additional units of utility. In particular, the more concave is g(), the more
egalitarian will be the nal allocation (see Atkinson, 1970). As such W (u) includes all
those cases that fall between two well-known extremes. On one hand, as g() approaches
a linear function, W (u) tends to the purely utilitarian SWF (Bentham, 1789): Wut (u) =
1u1 + 2u2. On the other hand, as g() becomes innitelyconcave, W (u) approaches
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the maxmin or Rawlsian SWF (Rawls, 1971): Wmm (u) = min f1u1; 2u2g.
For what concerns claimantsutility function, we assume that individual preferences
are such that:
u(xi; ri) = xi + (xi   ri) (1)
where the function () is a universal gain-loss function. Given the individual reference
point ri, where ri 2 [0; S] if S > 0 while ri 2 [S; 0] if S < 0, (xi ri) reects the additional
e¤ects that perceived gains or losses have on u() on top of the utility the agent gets from
the direct allocation of xi. In other words, we assume that claimants display reference
dependent preferences à la Koszegi and Rabin (2006).1,2 The function () satises the
following properties:
P1: (z) is continuous for all z, strictly increasing and such that (0) = 0.
P2: (z) is twice di¤erentiable for z 6= 0.
P3: 00(z) > 0 if z < 0 and 00(z) < 0 if z > 0.
(P3
0
: 00(z) = 0 for any z.)
P4: if y > z > 0 then (y) + ( y) < (z) + ( z).
P5: limz!0  0(z)= limz!0+ 0(z)   > 1.
In line with the original prospect theory formulation of Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
the function () is thus characterized by a kink at xi = ri. Property P3 species that
the function () is convex in the domain of losses (xi < ri) and concave in the domain of
gains (xi > ri). P3 also captures the standard property of diminishing marginal sensitivity
1Koszegi and Rabin (2006) actually introduce a more general family of utility functions given by
u(xi; ri) = m(xi) + (m(xi)   m(ri)) where m() is an increasing function that captures the direct ef-
fect of xi on total utility u(). In this paper, we thus set m(xi) = xi.
2Another fruitful approach to the modelization of reference dependent preferences appears in Munro
and Sugden (2003). The paper proposes a number of properties that individualspreferences should have
while the paper by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) proposes a number of properties that individuals utility
functions should have. While conceptually similar, we chose the latter approach as it more directly ts
our analysis which is based on the use of a social welfare function.
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of the agent to perceived gains and losses. The alternative assumption P3
0
covers instead
the simplied case in which the function () is linear and marginal sensitivity is thus
constant. P4 means that for large absolute values of z, the function () is more sensitive
to losses than to gains. P5 implies the same result for small values of z: () is steeper
approaching the reference point from the left (losses) rather than from the right (gains).
P4 and P5 thus capture the loss aversion phenomenon.
In what follows, we do not explicitly investigate the issue of how agents introspectively
select their reference points as the results of our model do not depend on the specic process
through which claimants dene ri (but section 2.1 reviews a number of possibilities that
the literature has proposed and discusses their appeal within the specic context of a
dispute). We focus instead on the matter of how claimants should strategically announce
their reference points to the judge with the goal of inuencing, obviously in their own
interest, the nal allocation of the good. We thus introduce rai , the key variable of the
model, which indicates the reference point that agent i announces to the adjudicator.
Obviously, rai 2 [0; S] if S > 0 while rai 2 [S; 0] if S < 0. Notice that rai may di¤er from ri,
i.e., what an agent claims (rai ) may di¤er from his true reference point (ri). Announced
claims are mutually incompatible whenever
P
i r
a
i > S. Section 2.1 briey reviews the
literature on reference point formation while the analysis of the model continues in section
2.2.
2.1 The literature on reference point formation
How an agent endowed with reference dependent preferences denes his reference point is
still an open question in economics as well as in psychology. The literature on the topic has
suggested a number of candidates whose appeal varies depending on the specic context
under scrutiny. Moreover, these interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A
rst option is that agents set ri in line with what they have or are used to. This is the
traditional status quo formulation originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979.
Such an explanation seems particularly appropriate when agents are involved in some kind
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of repeated interaction. For instance, an agent who repeatedly purchases a certain good
is likely to set as his reference point the price he is used to paying: a lower price would
then look like a gain while a higher price would sound like a loss. And if past prices are
not constant then the reference point can be a weighted average of those (see Shefrin and
Statman, 1985, for an application to asset pricing in behavioral nance).
Claimants can instead dene ri according to what they expect rather than to what
they have (but notice that the two proposals coincide whenever agents expect to maintain
the status quo, see Munro and Sugden, 2003, for a discussion about this tension). Recent
empirical evidence (see for instance Abeler et al., 2011) tends to support this view. As
a standard example (in line with Kahneman, 1992), consider the situation of a worker
who expects a wage increase of 500$ but then actually gets an increase of just 200$; this
outcome is likely to sound more like a loss with respect to expectations rather than a gain
with respect to the status quo. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) explicitly model the possibility
that the reference point is dened by agents expectations and introduce the notion of
personal equilibrium, i.e., a situation in which claimants hold rational reference points
that are then conrmed in equilibrium.
Yet another option is that agentsreference points are not fully rational. For instance,
individuals may set ri according to what they think they deserve in which case reference
points are likely to be plagued by behavioral biases such as the self-serving bias (Gallice,
2011, investigates some implications of this possibility). Finally, reference points can also
be set through social comparisons or by imitation. Hoch and Lowenstein (1991) show for
instance how social comparison can inuence consumersreference points and thus modify
their willingness to buy a certain product.
In the context of a dispute, the status-quo proposal does not seem particularly appro-
priate. Consider, for instance, a dispute between an injurer and a victim who never met
before such that the status quo is given by the situation before the accident occurred. But
if this interpretation is meaningful for the victim (in the status quo he received no harm
and therefore his benchmark is to get full reimbursement), it does not seem valid for the
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injurer (in the status quo he caused no accident and therefore he should set his reference
point as if he expects not to have to pay anything).
On the other hand, the option that litigants set their reference points according to
what they expect appears to be much more convincing. Litigants in fact inevitably build
their own expectations about the allocation that the adjudicator will implement and thus
compare the actual outcome with the expected one. If these expectations are correct (i.e.,
in line with the actual decision of the judge) or wrong (possibly due to agentsbiases)
depends on the degree of rationality of the players. We will come back to this issue in
commenting the results of the model.
2.2 The planners problem and the equilibrium of the game
In this section we solve the planners problem from the claimantspoint of view. Claimants
announce to the planner what they expect to get (i.e., the planner knows the vector
ra = (ra1 ; r
a
2)). Claimants then expect the planner to set ri = f(r
a
i ) with
@f
@rai
> 0. In other
words, claimants expect that the adjudicator, in assessing the agents unknown reference
point ri, will take into (positive) consideration the announced claim rai . Explicit examples
for the function f() include f(rai ) = rai (the planner takes into full consideration the
announced claims), f(rai ) = r
a
i with  2 (0; 1) (the planner discounts agentsclaims) and
f(rai ) =
Ep(ri)+r
a
i
2 (the planner takes an average between his own assessment of the true
reference point of agent i and the announced claim rai , where, for instance, Ep(ri) =
S
2
can be the adjudicators prior).
Litigants thus expect the planner to face and solve the following problem:
max
x1;x2
W (u) = [g (1x1 + 1(x1   f(ra1))) + g (2x2 + 2(x2   f(ra2)))] s.t. x1+x2 = S
(2)
The problem has a solution given that W (u) is a continuous function dened on the
closed and bounded space [0; S]  [0; S] if S > 0 or [S; 0]  [S; 0] if S < 0 and thus the
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Weierstrass theorem applies. In what follows we focus on those cases in which the functions
g(iui) for i 2 f1; 2g are concave. Notice that g() is strictly concave while ui() can be
linear, concave, or convex: in the rst two cases g(iui) is certainly concave while in the
latter case concavity depends on the specic functional forms of g() and ().
When the functions g(iui) are concave, it follows that also W (u) is concave and
therefore rst order conditions are su¢ cient. The optimal allocation x^ = (x^1; x^2), where
x^ = argmaxW (u) and x^2 = S   x^1, will thus equalize the marginal utilities of the two
claimants:
[p]z }| {
g0 (1x^1 + 1(x^1   f(ra1))
 [q]z }| {
1 + 1
0(x^1   f(ra1))

=
=

g0 (2(S   x^1) + 2(S   x^1   f(ra2))
| {z }
[r]

2 + 2
0(S   x^1   f(ra2))
| {z }
[t]
(3)
Condition (3) is an equality between two products of the form [p] [q] = [r] [t]. Now
assume that [q]  [t], i.e., [1 + 10(x^1   f(ra1))]  [2 + 20(S   x^1   ra2)]. For (3) to
hold it must then be the case that [p]  [r], that is:

g0 (1x^1 + 1(x^1   f(ra1)))
  g0 (2(S   x^1) + 2(S   x^1   f(ra2)) (4)
The function g() is strictly concave and monotonically increasing, which implies that
its derivative g0() is monotonically decreasing. It follows that (4) holds if and only if:
1x^1 + 1(x^1   f(ra1))  2S   2x^1 + 2(S   x^1   f(ra2)) (5)
Given that 1 + 2 = 1, the last condition can also be expressed as:
x^1 + 1(x^1   f(ra1))  2(S   x^1   f(ra2))  2S = k (6)
with k  0. We are now in the position to study the e¤ects that the announced
reference point rai has on x^i. Focusing without loss of generality on claimant i = 1, we
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can express (6) as:
F (x^1; r
a
1) = x^1 + 1(x^1   f(ra1))  2(S   x^1   f(ra2))  (2S + k) = 0 (7)
This is an implicit function that satises the assumptions of the implicit-function
theorem. In fact, property P2 of the gain-loss function () ensures that partial derivatives
@F (x^1;ra1 )
@x^1
and @F (x^1;r
a
1 )
@ra1
are continuous and di¤erent from zero for any x1 6= ra1 . Total
di¤erentiation of F (x^1; ra1) leads to:
1
@(x^1   f(ra1))
@f
@f
@rai
+

1 + 1
@(x^1   f(ra1))
@x^1
  2
@(S   x^1   f(ra2))
@x^1

@x^1
@ra1
= 0 (8)
such that @x^1@ra1
can be expressed as:
@x^1
@ra1
=
 1 @(x^1 f(r
a
1 ))
@f
@f
@rai
1 + 1
@(x^1 f(ra1 ))
@x^1
  2 @(S x^1 f(r
a
2 ))
@x^1
> 0 (9)
The numerator of the ratio is positive given that 1 > 0 and
@f
@rai
> 0 while, by
property P1 of the () function, @(x^1 f(ra1 ))@f < 0. The denominator is also positive. In
particular, the second term is positive (again by P1) while the third one is negative given
that x^2 = S   x^1 decreases as x^1 increases. It follows that @x^1@ra1 > 0.
Going back to equality (3), the result presented in (9) can be also obtained under the
alternative and mutually exclusive assumption [q] > [t], i.e., [1 + 1
0(x^1   f(ra1))] >
[2 + 2
0(S   x^1   f(ra2))]. In fact, the same steps remain valid with the only di¤erence
being that k < 0. But the sign and the magnitude of k do not inuence the result
presented in (9) as k disappears in the total di¤erentiation of F (x^1; ra1). Moreover, because
of symmetry, condition (9) also holds for claimant i = 2 such that we can state the main
result of this paper:
@x^i
@rai
> 0 for any i 2 f1; 2g (10)
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Given that the utility of claimant i is strictly increasing in xi,3 this result indicates
that agent i, even though he anticipates that he will possibly get x^i < rai , should purposely
inate his initial claim. In fact, in the nal allocation, what agent i gets (x^i) is positively
anchored to the reference point that he announced (rai ). Indeed, in the Nash equilibrium
of this announcement game, both agents announce r^ai = S if S > 0 and r^
a
i = 0 if S < 0.
The planner then chooses the allocation x^ in line with the specic SWF that he uses. For
instance, if the planner treats agents symmetrically (1 = 2 = 0:5), he implements the
Solomonic solution x^ =

S
2 ;
S
2
	
.4
Notice that rational claimants correctly anticipate the outcome x^ = fx^1; x^2g. Even
if they strategically announce r^ai , they ex-ante set their true reference point in line
with their rational expectations. In other words, and using the terminology of Koszegi
and Rabin (2006), in the personal equilibrium of this strategic dispute, rational claimants
announce r^ai but set ri = x^i. As such, the allocation x^i does not generate any perceived
gain or loss with respect to ri and the agentsutility is given by ui = x^i. On the other hand,
claimants that are not fully rational and set their reference point according to incorrect
expectations (for instance according to their self-serving biased view of what they think
they deserve) still announce r^ai but set ri > x^i. These claimants thus experience a loss
when the adjudicator implements x^ and they experience utility ui < x^i. This perceived
loss is maximal if agentsbias is extreme (ri = S if S > 0 or ri = 0 if S < 0). This is the
only case in which rai = ri, i.e., the announced and the actual reference points coincide.
In all other (rational and irrational) cases, the relation rai > ri holds, i.e., the announced
reference point is larger than the truereference point.
The following example uses simple functional forms for g(), () and f() to illustrate
the result established in (9) as well as the equilibrium of the game.
3 In particular, @u(xi;ri)
@xi
= 1 + 0xi(xi   ri) > 0 given that 0xi(xi   ri) > 0 (see property P1 of the 
function).
4The judges situation indeed resembles King Solomons problem of having to establish the ownership
of a baby between two women who both claimed to be his natural mother. As is well known, King Solomons
suggested solution was to cut the baby in half.
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Example 1 Let i 2 f1; 2g, g() = p, 1 = 2 = 0:5, (xi ri) =
8<: xi   ri if xi  ri2(xi   ri) if xi < ri ,
f(rai ) = r
a
i and S = 1. Then ui =
8<: 2xi   rai if xi  rai3xi   2rai if xi < rai . Claimants thus expect the
planner to maximize the function W (u) =
q
3
2x1   ra1 +
q
3
2x2   ra2 . First order condi-
tion is given by 32
q
3
2x1   ra1
 1
= 32
q
3
2(1  x1)  ra2
 1
and the optimal allocation is
x^ = (x^1; x^2) with x^1 = 12+
1
3(r
a
1 ra2) and x^2 = 1  x^1. Marginal e¤ects are strictly positive
@x^1
@ra1
= @x^2@ra2
= 13

and obviously they can also be retrieved using the decomposition in (9).
In equilibrium, r^a = f1; 1g and x^ = 12 ; 12	.
3 Conclusions
This paper explored the strategic aspects that may underlie litigantsdecisions to ask for
exceedingly high claims. More precisely, the paper showed that if claimants are charac-
terized by reference dependent preferences (an assumption that seems particularly appro-
priate in the context of disputes and litigations), and if they expect the judge to reach his
decision in line with the maximization of a general form of social welfare function, then
there is indeed an incentive for agents to announce high reference points. Claimants, in
fact, anticipate that in the nal allocation what they will get is positively anchored to
their initial claims. As such, agents purposively inate these claims.
Indeed, in our model the strategy to inate claims is strictly dominant. But notice that
the same strategy remains weakly dominant even in a richer (and perhaps more realistic)
framework in which the claimants are unsure about the type of adjudicator they face. Say
for instance that litigants do not know if the judge will take rai into account or will rather
ignore it. Even if claimants attach an  probability to the event that the planner is of
the rst type, still they maximize their expected utility by inating their claims. The
situation would instead be di¤erent if there is the possibility that the judge punishes the
announcement of a reference point that he considers to be too high. Still, the e¤ective
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punishment of excessive claims is rarely observed in the solution of disputes of litigations
where high claims might be stigmatized but then are at most ignored.
A further point to notice concerns claimants true reference points as these are the
ones that ultimately a¤ect agentsactual perception of the nal allocation. As the model
indicates, these true reference points remain unknown to the adjudicator and, whenever
agents hold irrational and biased expectations, they are not even conrmed in equilibrium.
An interesting aspect to explore is thus the possible existence of an incentive compatible
mechanism that the adjudicator can design in order to elicit agentstrue reference points.
A potential candidate is a mechanism à la Groves (1973), i.e., a mechanism that involves
some specic compensation rules that could induce claimants to truthfully reveal their
types/reference points. Still our framework presents some important peculiarities with
respect to a standard Groves setting. For instance it involves the maximization of a
welfare function that in general does not coincide with the plain sum of individual utilities,
it features the presence of a behavioral component within agents preferences, and it
requires the nal allocation to be budget-balanced, i.e., the allocation and the transfers
implemented by the judge cannot create surpluses or decits. The design of an incentive
compatible mechanism that adjudicators can use to elicit agentsclaims thus appears to
be an intriguing and challenging task to which we will devote future research.
4 Appendix
4.1 Endogenous determination of S in a bilateral accident
In the following example we show how the expected size of the good upon which a dispute
may eventually start can be endogenously determined by some previous actions of the
claimants that take into account the allocation rule that will be implemented by the
adjudicator. In particular, we analyze a standard tort model and show how our framework
can easily accomodate di¤erent liability rules that are commonly used in practice.
In line with the standard economic analysis of accident law à la Shavell (1987), consider
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the situation of a bilateral accident that involves two agents: an injurer (agent 1, say a
driver) and a victim (agent 2, say a byciclist). The accident, if it occurs, causes a loss
S =  100 but both agents can ex-ante take costly actions that reduce the probability
of this event. More precisely, agents can decide if to exert a low or a high level of care.
Let ci with i 2 f1; 2g be the costs associated with these actions as expressed in Table 1
below. The table (which replicates Table 2.3 in Shavell, 1987, page 11) also reports the
accident probability, the expected accident loss and the total accident loss. The latter is
given by the sum of the expected accident loss and the costs incurred by the two agents.
The socially optimal outcome is the one that minimizes total costs.
Table 1.
Levels
of care
Cost
ci
Accident
probability
Expected
loss S
Total
costs
1 2 1 2
low low 0 0 15%  15 15
low high 0 2 12%  12 14
high low 3 0 10%  10 13
high high 3 2 6%  6 11
As in the main text, let agentsutility function be given by ui(xi; ri) = xi + (xi   ri)
for i 2 f1; 2g where xi 2 [S; 0] is the part of the accident loss that the adjudicator requires
agent i to cover and (xi   ri) captures agents reference dependent preferences. The
adjudicator wants to maximize the function W (u) =
P
i g(iui). Let the function g()
approach a linear one such that W (u) tends to a purely utilitarian social welfare function.
Such a specication captures a number of di¤erent liability rules.
For instance, if 2 ! 1 the planner only cares about the welfare of the victim and
thus follows a rule of strict liability. In line with our model, if an accident occurs agents
announce the vector r^a = (r^a1 ; r^
a
2) = (0; 0) (i.e., both agents claim no responsibility what-
soever) and the judge implements the allocation x^ = (x^1; x^2) = ( 100; 0). If it is common
knowledge that strict liability is the rule in use, then the injurer rationally decides to exert
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a high level of care (his marginal benet is greater than his cost) while the victim, given
that he will be fully compensated, exerts a low level of care.
On the contrary, if 1 ! 1 then there is no liability and the planner allocates the entire
loss to the victim. If a dispute arises, agents again announce r^a = (0; 0) but the judge now
implements x^ = (0; S). Under this liability rule, the injurer thus exerts low care while
the victim exerts high care.
A third possible liability rule is the so called strict division of accident loss (see Shavell,
1987, section 2.2.4) in which each agent i bears a fraction (1  i) of any loss that occurs
no matter their actual level of care. For instance, if 1 = 2 = 0:5 then r^
a = (0; 0) and
x^ =
  S2 ; S2  as both parties bear an equal fraction of the loss. Therefore, none of them
decides to exert a high level of care and the accident occurs with 15% probability.
Our framework also accomodates more complex (but more commonly used) liability
rules such as the comparative neglicence rule, the neglicence rule with the defense of
contributory neglicence, and strict liability with the defense of relative neglicence (see
Shavell, 1987, for a detailed description of these rules). If the planner/adjudicator properly
sets and announces the level of care that one or both parties are expected to exert to be
considered not liable then the socially optimal outcome (in this example both agents exert
high care) can be endogenously achieved.
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